Showing posts with label Foreign Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Foreign Policy. Show all posts

Friday, September 5, 2008

Is the OAS Undermining Constitutional Law in Bolivia?

   

Jose Miguel Insulza and Evo Morales

Last Friday the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), Jose Miguel Insulza, made the following statement to the press on the situation in Bolivia:

"One can say a lot about Bolivia, one can write a lot; they can say many things in the press, but the democratic vocation of the Bolivian people never will be written about enough.  This is a government that is disposed, as President Evo Morales said, to settle all subjects by the ballot box and not by arms.  And it is that everyone who wants to vote is going to vote; everyone who wants to express their opinion is going to express it. . . ."

". . . Understanding is then the only way that Bolivia can come out elegantly, not only for approving its Constitution -which is something so necessary, so good- but also to be able to put limits on inequality, and to be able to have peace and harmony in a society in which all Bolivians can have a place. . . ."


At first glance, Secretary General Insulza appears to speak for the cause of democracy in Latin America and we can view his statement as a policy that deserves our support.  But there could be more to his easy generalizations about democracy that we should take into account.  It is not so much what Insulza said as what he did not say that should give us pause to look more closely at his statement.

Insulza only mentions democracy and elections, he said nothing about constitutional law in Bolivia, and that is a major failing on his part, because the underlying problem that is impelling the current crisis in that country is the total absence of constitutional law, not the security of elections nor the will of the people to accept the results of voting.  The central complaint of the four departments of the so-called Media Luna, which were joined recently by the Department of Chuquisaca, is that Evo Morales and the MAS party have governed outside the norms of the Bolivian constitution, especially with respect to their virtual abolition of the power of the Bolivian Senate, which is the principal legislative body in which the five departments have political weight.  And what is most disconcerting about these actions on the part of Morales and his government, and which Insulza ignored in his statement, is that they were carried out by means of the exercise of violence and intimidation of their opponents.

While there are important ideological differences between Morales and his opponents that are contributing to the tension in Bolivia, the opposition has presented two principal charges against his governance that are of immediate importance, and which refer to the use of the violent intimidation and obstruction of the Bolivian Senate as a means of the achievement of the political program of the MAS.  In November, 2007, by means of a surprise maneuver in the Bolivian Congress that required opposition delegates to rush at full speed to the legislative precincts at the Plaza Murillo in La Paz, MAS delegates and their allies began a special and unexpected session to examine their legislation designed to repeal part of the Hydrocarbons Law of 2004.  In the original form of this law, which Bolivians approved in a national referendum that same year, producing departments, which include the Media Luna and Chuquisaca, were guaranteed a level of revenues from the Direct Hydrocarbons Tax (IDH in its Spanish abbreviation) equal to the revenues of the non-producing departments of the west of the country, something which the MAS intended to change in order to dedicate these revenues to the renta Dignidad, a pension that would be paid to Bolivians over 60 years of age.  But when the opposition delegates arrived, they were denied entry into the special session by a large number of MAS supporters, who surrounded the legislative precincts and used intimidation and some small acts of violence so as to permit only MAS delegates and their allies to participate in the legislative deliberations.  The La Paz daily newspaper La Razón reported that the head of the Podemos opposition party, which controls the Bolivian Senate, requested guarantees for the security of their delegates to enter the building and join the special session, which proceeded with only MAS members and their allies present, who voted to approve the legislation.  It was not legal and the Constitutional Tribunal of Bolivia, which was already weakened by the resignations of some of its members, was unable to force Morales and the MAS to change course.

The second and much more serious charge the opposing departments make against Evo Morales and the MAS for their delegitimization of the Bolivian Senate relates to the violence of the last days of February of this year in the Plaza Murillo in La Paz that is associated with the voting in the Congress on Morales's project for a new constitution, an event now known in the country as El Cerco (the siege).  During three days between the 27th and 29th of that month MAS supporters, including many mobilized from labor unions and other organizations known as the Sectores Sociales (Social Sectors), occupied the Plaza Murillo in the center of the seat of government in La Paz, a mobilization begun as a manifestation of political support for Morales and his Political Constitution of the State (CPE by its Spanish abbreviation).  But the MAS legislators in the Bolivian Congress transformed the process on the 28th when they moved to present their version of the new charter, commonly known as the Oruro Draft for a new constitution, which the MAS wrote without opposing delegates present in the sessions of the constituent assembly in the department of the same name.

Again La Razón informs us of the details of what occurred in the Plaza Murillo during the legislative session of the 28th of February.  Though the day began with no more than a few hundred protesters participating in the demonstration, the situation changed in the afternoon.  After midday groups of miners began arriving, announcing their presence with dynamite explosions, and later the local capital police, who were present up to this point, were pushed aside and replaced by representatives of the unions who acted as policemen in their place.  In the legislature a MAS deputy brought some 50 of the "Ponchos Rojos" -- a farmers organization known for their intimidation of MAS opponents -- into the interior of the building to serve as "Official Deputies," who were joined later by a group of miners accompanied by another MAS deputy and who exercised strict control over the proceedings.  The opposing Podemos Party pleaded from the seat of the vice presidency that they not try to pass the constitution by means of an illegal session, but without result.  While a Bolivian television audience watched as events unfolded live before their eyes, two female opposition deputies who tried to enter the building were beaten and they were denied the opportunity to participate in the session.  Only the delegates and representatives allied with the MAS were permitted to enter and, naturally, in the absence of opposition in the Senate, the Oruro Draft was approved through acts of violence, and moreover it can be said, without legitimacy.

The two above-mentioned controversies can be found at the heart of the charges the opposition makes against Evo Morales and his MAS party.  Morales's opponents have presented their case before the Bolivian people and the world as a plea for the invocation of constitutional law in their country.  And their argument is easy to understand.  If they must accept the results of elections that have awarded the presidency to Evo Morales and have converted the MAS into the prime political force in the country, is it not so that Evo Morales and the MAS must accept the results of those elections for seats in the Chamber of Deputies and especially the Senate that were decided in favor of opposition candidates? The two issues of the refusal of Evo Morales and the MAS to permit opposition delegates to the Congress to participate in the deliberations on modifications to the Hydrocarbons Law of 2004 and the approval of the presentation of the new constitution to the people suggest that it is officialdom that will not accept the results of elections in Bolivia, not their opponents.

But there is still more to the actions of Evo Morales and the MAS that confirms the accusation that they intend to abolish the power of the Bolivian Senate, where the opposition can exercise an influence over the country's political process.  The Bolivian Constitution requires the approval of the Congress for nominations to the Constitutional Tribunal of the country.  As of today, of the five positions on this body, four are unfilled owing to resignations and Evo Morales has not presented new candidates to the Congress to fill these vacancies, because he will have to obtain the approval of the Senate.  What has resulted is an institutional vacuum that has permitted Morales to proceed with the restructuring of the Bolivian state, without laws or judicial bodies to restrain his actions.

More than anything, it is this institutional vacuum that has impelled today's crisis in Bolivia, and opposition leaders in the Media Luna and Chuquisaca have made a call to have their pleas for its restoration heard, but with little success.  A recent statement of the Prefect of the Department of Pando, one of the four of the Media Luna, makes the case that the world is not paying attention at this moment:

“With an illegitimate constitution one will not be able to govern.  They have broken institutionality in the country since we no longer have a Constitutional Tribunal.  [Evo Morales] swears that the Constituent Assembly is legal and we have sworn from the first day that it is illegal.  Who can decide whether you or we are right? We have not advanced a millimeter.  I am so disappointed. . . .”

Leopoldo Fernandez
Prefect, Departament of Pando


As of this moment, the importance of reinforcing constitutional law in Bolivia grows each day.  After the recent revocatory referendums, both Evo Morales and the prefects of the Media Luna believe their positions have been strengthened.  The five eastern departments have launched a full-scale shutdown of important transit routes so as to put economic pressure on Morales and his government to return the fiscal revenues of the IDH tax.  Evo Morales has responded by throwing constitutional law to the ground once and for all.  He now claims that he has the power to convene a national referendum on his constitution by presidential decree and he has fixed December 7 as the date of the voting, while the five eastern departments have pledged they will not recognize the call to go to the polling places that day.  This week the National Electoral Court declared that the referendum can only be called by an act of the Congress, a decision Morales has chosen to ignore  And without a Constitutional Tribunal to resolve the controversy, chaos does not appear to be very far away for the country.

And what does Jose Miguel Insulza offer Bolivians as a means of bringing the crisis to an end through dialog? Nothing more than a statement that does not mention the crisis in the exercise of constitutional law in Bolivia and which instead of that solution opts for an endorsement of the position of Evo Morales -- everything should be submitted to the will of a simple majority of voters.

In the absence of constitutional law the exercise of the will of the majority can be converted into tyranny.  But the tyranny of the majority is still tyranny.  The support for constitutional law, at the very least, apportions a degree of control to this tyranny.  But if a people is stripped of their access to constitutional law, they have few other recourses at their disposition to protect their liberties.

One of these recourses is the right of revolution.

Let us hope that Jose Miguel Insulza learns this lesson with all due speed and that it is manifested in the support of the OAS for constitutional law in Bolivia with the same fervor they show for supporting democracy, because the two are inseparable.

StJacques

   
NOTE:  A Spanish version of this article is available at Minuto60.com
   

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Sunday, June 15, 2008

Discussing the U.S. Embargo vs. Cuba:  Some of the Good Guys are Raising Serious Questions

   
I'm making this blog entry as something of a blog research note on the issue of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba.  It seems that there is an awakening interest among many bloggers I personally count among the "good guys" -- the anti-Castro, true lovers of freedom crowd -- who are urging that the U.S. should rethink the usefulness and/or efficacy of the trade embargo imposed against Cuba.  I think I have seen enough in recent weeks to stop and enter a post here asking readers to consider the matter as something worthy of attention.

First; let me give you some facts.  The "embargo" is a term that is usually used to refer to both the limitation of exports of non-food and non-medicinal American commodities to Cuba, as well as prohibitions against the import of Cuban products into the U.S., especially sugar.  It has been a complicated economic policy that began with an embargo on shipments of military goods to Cuba in March, 1958 that was later expanded to include sanctions against the import into America of Cuban sugar in 1960 and has since undergone periods of revision in both the temporary relaxation of restrictions on U.S. exports to the island, as in the period 1977-1982, interspersed with sometimes complex restrictions on what the levels of American economic contact with Cuba and the Cuban people should be under law.  Exports of American food and medicine always have been permitted, but the big issue is the level of person-to-person contact, which is a matter of major concern among many Cuban immigrant families in the U.S., who would like to be able to send greater financial assistance to their relatives and loved ones remaining on the island.

I am going to skip an overview of the arguments put forth by the pro-Fidel sympathizers here in the U.S., which usually come down to the hateful gringos resenting the rise of a truly democratic [sic] revolution of the left so close to their shores and the policy is implemented on behalf of the Cuban-American "fat cats" in Miami who left with all that money when Castro came to power, and, well; you get that picture clearly enough.  However, I would like to point out that there are two groups calling for either an end to or revision of the embargo who deserve our attention; Cuban dissidents now resident on the island, as well as numerous and genuine "freedom blogger" commentators outside of it.  I think these are people whose arguments merit an examination, because they are working conscientiously to bring an end to Castro's tyranny and I am all for that under any circumstances.

Let me identify three very important Cuban dissident elements who are asking Americans to end the embargo; the well-known Generación Y blogger Yoani Sanchez, prominent Cuban dissident and political activist Martha Beatriz Roque (you can find both on the sidebar), and the organization of women known as the Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White) who are seeking freedom for Cuban political prisoners.  All three have stood up to the Castro regime under the most difficult of circumstances, which should give them credibility.  And I do not offer this comment by way of suggesting that we should accept their arguments simply because they are Cuban dissidents in place, because Yoani did say she preferred Barack Obama to John McCain and I am in no doubt that Obama has some more than questionable credentials with respect to support for democracy and freedom in Latin America.  He has close ties to some of Hugo Chavez's biggest supporters in America, including George Soros the main man for Evo Morales, along with a near hatred of the Colombian government.  These are but two of many things that make him look dangerous and no matter how hard we try to get him to answer some of the tough questions that would clarify his positions on these issues he refuses to respond, leaving us unassured of his good faith.  But I think we can write off the comments of the Cuban dissidents on Obama to naiveté, since they do not receive all the information we get with easy access to our media.  The important thing for us is to filter out what lies underneath the declarations of the Cuban resistance to Castro -- the embargo is hurting those who are trying to make a difference.  That is a statement worth listening to in my opinion.

There are a few worthy bloggers who have also called for a re-examination of the embargo recently, including at least two who have very high credibility with me for their proven record of consistent activism in the cause of freedom.  Marc Masferrer at Uncommon Sense has been doing an excellent job in tracking the plight of political prisoners in Cuba for some time now, and he recently posted a plea to avoid implementing the embargo in a way that hurts ordinary Cubans, especially the relatives of Cuban-American emigrés who would wish to travel to the island and send amounts of money above the limits imposed by law at present (which were $100 per month according to the last report I read).  Marc had already made a similar statement last year when he identified the problems with permitting one type of trade that benefited American farmers while forbidding transit for Americans of Cuban descent to visit family members; setting up priorities he described as "skewed."  And now Alek Boyd, who for the last three years or more has been one of the most important bloggers publicizing the case against Hugo Chavez and whose work I have followed quite closely has made an even stronger statement, urging that the embargo has been counterproductive as a whole and should be scrapped altogether.  The main points of Alek's argument are that the embargo has strengthened the stature of the Castro regime internationally for the attention it gets in its conflict with the American superpower to the north, the policy has hurt those people in Cuba we would wish to help most, the developing Cuban dissident movement is asking for our assistance by requesting an end to the policy, and removing the embargo will strip the Castro regime of the only excuse it has had to hold up to the Cuban people for its inability to provide them with the promised benefits of a revolution that has failed utterly at every level.

These are two very different approaches to a re-examination of the embargo, and I expect Alek Boyd's proposal will generate some strong opposition among many who pay close attention to the Castro regime.  But I must repeat what I wrote in the previous paragraph, which is that I have read Alek's blogging on numerous issues affecting freedom and democracy in Latin America and I believe his extensive record of service in the causes of each merits a fair hearing for his proposal. 

So what do I think?  Well; like Marc Masferrer I am most concerned about the plight of the Cuban people themselves; especially those who have been cut off from work opportunities by the Castro regime for maintaining contacts with their relatives and loved ones here in the U.S.  I do advocate loosening the restrictions on the amount of money families can send to relatives in Cuba and I would like to see travel restrictions relaxed to make their passage to and from the island a lot easier than it is now.  I recognize that Alek Boyd has presented a very thoughtful and well-intentioned argument against the wisdom of the embargo, but I still see the flip side of its immediate and total elimination as resulting in the gravitation of new financial resources -- read "liquidity" -- into the hands of the regime which would be a counterproductive result and therefore is a course I am unwilling to recommend without seeing some signs of progress on democracy and human rights, and I immediately demand a release of the political prisoners in that regard.

My suggestion for a process that can result in the lifting of the embargo is that we Americans first agree upon a basic principle, which is that we will attempt to separate what benefits the Castro regime from what helps the Cuban people and that we then sit down and ask ourselves how the outlines of a policy that would achieve the genuine aim of improving the condition of ordinary Cubans can best be formulated.  Then we take the first step.

I therefore propose the following three measures:

  • Dramatically raise the limit on monthly cash disbursements American families can send to relatives in Cuba.

  • Ease travel restrictions for Americans wishing to visit their relatives and loved ones on the island.

  • Open up American export trade to Cuba -- which is already larger than many people think for our agricultural products -- to include consumer goods not useful to the regime for purposes other than private use.


  • I recommend that we take the above three steps unilaterally without any preconditions so that we can then turn to the Castro regime and say "it's your turn," leaving the onus to respond entirely upon their shoulders.  And it may be useful to propose a gradualized process of trading one specific step for another in return that will lead eventually to the complete renewal of trade and the full recognition of human rights in Cuba, rather than insisting upon a complete capitulation to all terms at once, which we should understand is a political impossibility for the Castro regime.  However, we must demand the release of all political prisoners as an absolutely necessary first step, and, as distasteful as it may be to bargain, gradually work our way to the restoration of full political rights.

    Step by step, solid action for meaningful response, engaging in an open and meaningful process that produces results and does not imply capitulation for either side.  I do not believe that there will be any turning back for the Castro regime once it starts the process as it will most certainly involve the Cuban people in a way they have never been mobilized before; a development that can have but one result -- freedom.

    StJacques
       

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    Wednesday, May 14, 2008

    Nueva agenda Demócrata para América Latina: Multipolarismo  ¿Un regreso a las esferas de influencia?  (Traducción)

       

    Barack ObamaHugo Chavez

    Autor:  StJacques    Traducción por:  StJacques y Jorge Pareja

    La siguiente es una traducción de mi propia entrada del 30 de abril titulado (en Inglés) "Part II of The New Democrat Foreign Policy Agenda for Latin America...".

    Esta es la segunda parte del análisis de la agenda de política exterior estadounidense tal como fue desarrollada por el Senador de Connecticut Christopher Dodd en su discurso reciente ante la Academia Naval, el cual creo, y teniendo en cuenta que el Senador en comento ha respaldado la candidatura de Barack Obama, puede llegar a tomarse como direccionador de las nuevas perspectivas del Partido Demócrata para las relaciones de EE.UU. con América Latina.

    Permítanme volver a los apartes del discurso del Senador, publicados en la parte 1, tomados del blog de Oppenheimer, para hacer énfasis en dos partes fundamentales de lo que Dodd dice:


    "[...] Colombia todavía lucha con la desmovilización de los paramilitares, con la impunidad y otras violaciones de los derechos humanos. Ha tenido avances hacia la seguridad de sus ciudadanos y establecer el imperio de la ley. Colombia ha soportado 40 años de violencia enfrentando organizaciones terroristas poderosas empeñadas en destruir el Estado. [...] Millares de ciudadanos fueron asesinados y secuestrados. En un caso particularmente descarado, las guerrillas se asociaron al cártel de la droga de Medellín, asediaron al Palacio de la Justicia colombiano por 26 horas, y asesinaron once Magistrados.

    A la luz de una historia violenta, y a la luz de los desafíos complejos que todavía asedian a Colombia, me parece que enfocar de manera tan estrecha la solución en los acuerdos comerciales bilaterales carece de sentido. El comercio bilateral [de Colombia] con los Estados Unidos es importante, pero es solamente un elemento.

    [...] El Presidente Uribe ha centrado sus esfuerzos en reuniones con los Estados Unidos, pero él tiene que aplicar la misma energía para reunirse con sus vecinos. El Presidente Uribe tiene que pasar tantas horas en viajes a la Argentina, al Brasil y a otros vecinos igual a la intensidad con que viaja a Washington. Al hacerlo, forjará relaciones políticas, sociales y económicas más profundas.

    [...] La seguridad y el futuro económico de América latina no están vinculados solamente a los acuerdos bilaterales con los Estados Unidos. El comercio regional y el compromiso político van a servir mucho mejor los intereses de todos juntos con repartos comerciales independientemente negociados e instituidos con los Estados Unidos. [...]"


    Es evidente que Dodd está empujando a la integración regional, a pesar de que apenas alude a la idea en su declaración. En el caso de las relaciones de Colombia con la Argentina y el Brasil esto tiene nombre propio: Mercosur. El movimiento hacia un “mercado común meridional”, un plan para la integración regional en el que Colombia participe, a pesar de las relaciones tensas con muchos de los socios de este grupo.

    Creo que debemos hacer un alto y dimensionar las implicaciones de esta decisión política:

    Dodd recomienda alejarse del libre comercio, y avanzar hacia la integración regional, dejando a Colombia gravitando en la esfera de intereses regionales definidos por Brasil y Argentina, abandonando el mantenimiento de los compromisos de Estados Unidos que se remontan a la negociación del Plan Colombia durante la presidencia de Clinton y de la continuación con su puesta en práctica durante la administración actual junto con la negociación de un Tratado de Libre Comercio.

    Con respecto al Brasil y a la Argentina, hay problemas serios con las políticas que han perseguido con respecto a su ayuda, a veces sutil a veces abierta, a la “izquierda bolivariana” en América Latina. Los regímenes de ambos países están endeudados con Hugo Chávez, especialmente en el caso de Argentina que se ha beneficiado de petróleo venezolano y subsidios de gas por miles de millones de dólares. Esta propuesta política lanzaría a Colombia a los brazos de las naciones que han ayudado abiertamente o secretamente a rasgar al país en pedazos. Es además la traición a una nación amiga que necesita desesperadamente el apoyo americano para el mantenimiento de su integridad territorial y su vida democrática.

    Christopher Dodd recomienda, y podemos asumir que concurre Barack Obama, que los Estados Unidos deben alejarse del compromiso de más de cincuenta años de apoyar un orden mundial basado en un sistema uniforme de seguridad colectiva que mantendría un estándar común para los valores humanos y continuaría la expansión económica del mundo. ¿Y qué lo sustituirá? Pues bien, si examinamos cuidadosamente las observaciones del Senador Dodd sobre el uso de “comercio regional”, parece que le favorece un orden que divide al mundo en lo que los euro-izquierdistas llaman “centros polares del poder regional”, que es la expresión moderna de las llamadas “Esferas de Influencia”.

    El orden mundial encarnado en las Naciones Unidas posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial fue creado en virtud de un entendimiento común de que el sistema que consistía en sustituir había sido definido por las esferas de la influencia regionales y/o imperiales y que las normas universales en materia de seguridad, expresión humana y la vida económica tenían que ser los principios básicos de un nuevo orden mundial que preservaría la paz y el futuro de la humanidad.

    La síntesis Multi-Polar se pone de lado del reconocimiento de los “centros polares de poder”, los orígenes de lo que representa un rechazo de la tradición del universalismo que ha formado la base del orden mundial desde la creación de la ONU. Esto no se trata de un cambio evolutivo en la política mundial y la sociedad, es una alteración fundamental del orden mundial, y debemos explicar por qué naciones desarrolladas y en desarrollo con excepción de los Estados Unidos impulsan su adopción.

    Aunque muchos factores pueden influir en el desarrollo de un orden mundial Multi-Polar, la influencia más importante es un juego de simple economía. Muchas de las sociedades desarrolladas del mundo han aprendido que no pueden sostener el crecimiento económico en un verdadero entorno competitivo capitalista, ya que han puesto en práctica políticas sociales que los han despojado del capital productivo y que los dejan rezagados para competir en la nueva economía global. Y hay otras naciones justo a las afueras de este grupo, que incluyen a China y Rusia, que tienen marcas muy desiguales de desarrollo capitalista, pero que aún temen las consecuencias políticas de la aceptación de valores universales como un desarrollo que crearía conflictos con sus intereses nacionales percibidos.

    Los orígenes verdaderos del Multi-Polarismo, especialmente en su formulación teórica, se encuentran en las naciones de Europa occidental, siendo Francia y Alemania los mejores ejemplos, donde onerosos programas sociales domésticos han levantado el coste del empleo empresarial a un punto que ha mantenido al desempleo gravitando entre el diez y el quince por ciento. Estas son cifras excesivamente elevadas que tienen el potencial de crear verdaderos conflictos internos y han llevado a estas naciones a impulsar políticas internacionales diseñadas para cambiar las reglas del juego, en lugar de hacer frente a estas dificultades dentro de sus sistemas políticos internos.

    La solución a los problemas del bajo crecimiento económico entre las sociedades desarrolladas ha sido una tarea que trata de definir las esferas de interés, donde podrán disfrutar las ventajas de la falta de competencia comercial que permitirá a sus economías nacionales funcionar sin hacer frente al gasto social nacional.

    Ya ha habido ejemplos visibles que muestran su efecto debilitante sobre el orden internacional. La rebatiña entre las principales naciones por el acceso preferencial al petróleo iraquí antes de la guerra de Irak, con TotalFinaElf de Francia es el mejor/peor ejemplo, donde se demostró que las preocupaciones por mantener los estándares del derecho internacional carecen de sentido cuando el interés económico nacional estaba en juego. Pero también hay otros casos que demuestran esta tendencia, como la negociación de mercados exclusivos en África para los granos “no modificados genéticamente” europeos. Se puede recordar la forma en que algunos miembros de la Unión Europea estaban dispuestos a dejar morir de hambre a los zambianos en 2002 por preservar su mercado de alimentos no alterados genéticamente.

    Las normas universales que fueron encarnadas en la formulación original de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y el orden internacional del período posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial serían reliquias si el Multi-Polarismo se convierte en la base aceptada para la definición de un nuevo orden mundial y contaríamos con ello si los Estados Unidos lo respalda, como el discurso de Christopher Dodd parece sugerir.

    El Multi-Polarismo es el verdadero imperialismo social que cabe en la definición clásica de imperialismo de Vladimir Lenin mucho más que el modelo universal del orden posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial que se pretende sustituir. Se incorpora un nuevo orden, organizado para apoyar las metas gemelas de limitar la competencia económica entre las naciones desarrolladas a favor de la adquisición exclusiva de acceso al comercio, y sacrificar el nivel de crecimiento económico mundial. Pero, las sociedades en desarrollo necesitan de un sistema internacional regulado que preserve la paz social que las sociedades más avanzadas disfrutan actualmente a expensas de sus vecinos menos desarrollados.

    El Multi-Polarismo también augura un futuro oscuro para la libertad y la democracia, las razones se puede ver en el caso de Colombia, una nación que lucha por preservar la democracia y la libertad humana la están echado a un lado y la obligan a cambiar su camino para acomodar los intereses de potencias regionales que han apoyado su desestabilización y el debilitamiento de su sociedad democrática libre.

    Cuando se oye la llamada de Barack Obama para las conversaciones directas con Chávez y Castro, o cuando se lee los planteamientos del Senador Christopher Dodd, o cuando ambos se niegan a reconocer y discutir las amenazas a la democracia y la libertad que la “izquierda bolivariana” plantea a la región, se tiene su visión del futuro para la política exterior estadounidense si se adopta la síntesis Multi-Polarista, como los demócratas instan ahora. Es el único marco en el que serán capaces de promover una agenda social cuyos niveles de gasto nos despojará del capital productivo que ha hecho de los Estados Unidos una nación próspera desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Y lo que es peor, la preservación y apoyo a la democracia y la libertad también están en riesgo.


    StJacques
       

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    Wednesday, April 30, 2008

    Part II of The New Democrat Foreign Policy Agenda for Latin America:  Multi-Polarism -- A Return to Spheres of Influence

       

    Barack ObamaHugo Chavez

    This is the second part of an analysis I am posting of the larger implications of the agenda for American Foreign Policy as developed within the speech of Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd in his recent address to the Naval Academy, which I believe, in the absence of clarity from Barack Obama, whose candidacy Dodd has endorsed, can be taken as representative of the new outlook of the Democratic Party for U.S. relations with Latin America.

    Let me re-post the quote I excerpted in my previous post, which I took from the Oppenheimer blog on Latin America, though this time I want to underline two key parts of what Dodd says:


    ". . . Colombia still struggles with the demobilization of paramilitaries, impunity and other human rights violations.

    It has made progress towards advancing its citizens’ security and establishing the rule of law.

    Colombia has faced a 40-year onslaught waged by powerful terrorist organizations bent on destroying the state.

    Thousands of citizens were murdered and kidnapped. In one particularly brazen instance, guerillas linked to the Medellin drug cartel laid siege to the Colombian Palace of Justice for 26 hours, and assassinated eleven Supreme Court Justices.

    In light of a violent history, and in light of the complex challenges still facing Colombia, it seems to me our narrow focus on a bilateral trade agreements makes little sense. Bilateral trade with the United States is important, but it’s only one element.

    “Free Trade” between Colombia and America is not a panacea—we should stop selling it as such.

    President Uribe of Colombia has focused his efforts on engaging the United States, but he needs to apply the same energy engaging his neighbors.

    President Uribe needs to spend as much time travelling to Argentina, Brazil and other neighbors as frequently as he travels to Washington.

    In doing so, he will be forging deeper political, social and economic relationships.

    Latin America’s security, and economic future isn’t just tied to bilateral deals with the United States.

    Regional trade and political engagement will far better serve everyone’s interests along with independently negotiated and instituted trade deals with the United States. . . ."


    Clearly Dodd is pushing regional integration, though he only barely alludes to the idea in his statement. In the case of Colombia's relations with Argentina and Brazil this means the Mercosur process; the movement toward a "Southern Common Market," a plan for regional integration in which Colombia does participate, in spite of strained relations with many of its Mercosur partners.

    I think everyone should immediately stop and recognize the larger implications of this policy decision. Dodd recommends moving away from free trade, moving towards regional integration, leaving Colombia to gravitate to the sphere of regional interest defined by Brazil and Argentina, rather than maintaining U.S. commitments which date back to the negotiation of Plan Colombia during the Clinton presidency and continuing through its implementation during the current administration along with the negotiation of a free trade agreement. With respect to Brazil and Argentina, there are serious problems with the policies they have pursued with regard to their support, at times subtle at others open, for the Bolivarian Left in Latin America. The regimes in both countries are indebted to Hugo Chavez for political aid he has given to them, especially so in the case of Argentina which has benefited from Venezuelan oil and gas subsidies to the tune of billions of dollars. This policy goal would force Colombia into the arms of nations who have been either openly or covertly working to tear the country apart. It is further betrayal of a friendly nation that desperately needs American support for the maintenance of its territorial integrity and democratic way of life.

    At the very least Christopher Dodd recommends, and we may assume Barack Obama concurs, that the United States should move away from its fifty plus year commitment to support a world order founded upon a uniform system of collective security that likewise would uphold a common standard for human values and continue world economic expansion. And what will replace it? Well; if we examine Dodd's remarks about using "regional trade" carefully, it appears that he favors an order that divides the world into what Euro-Leftists refer to as "Polar Centers of Regional Power," which is the modern expression of what were long called "Spheres of Influence."

    The post-World War II world order embodied in the United Nations was created under a common understanding that the system it was to replace had been defined by regional and/or imperial spheres of influence and that universal standards in security, human expression, and economic life had to be the cornerstones of a new world order that would preserve the peace and humankind's future. The Multi-Polarist Synthesis puts this aside in favor of the recognition of "polar centers of power," the origins of which represent a rejection of the tradition of universalism that has formed the underpinning of world order ever since the inception of the U.N. This is not an evolutionary change in world politics and society; it is a fundamental alteration of world order, and we must explain why developed and developing nations other than the United States urge its adoption.

    Though many influential factors can be considered as contributing to the development of a Multi-Polarist world order, I believe the most important influence is basic economics. Many of the world's more developed societies have learned that they cannot sustain economic growth in a truly competitive capitalist environment because they have implemented domestic social policies that have stripped capital of its productivity and which leave them lagging behind in the drive to compete in the new global economy. And there are other nations just outside of this group, which would include China and Russia, who both have a very mixed brand of capitalist development but who still fear the political implications of the acceptance of universal values as a development which would create conflicts with their perceived national interests. Multi-Polarism's true origins, especially in its theoretical formulation, lie with the nations of Western Europe, with France and Germany being the best examples, where expensive domestic social programs have raised the cost of employment for business enterprise to a point where the norms for national unemployment begin at a low of ten percent and usually lie somewhere between there and fifteen percent. These are unreasonably high figures that have the potential for creating genuine domestic unrest and have impelled these nations to foreign policies designed to change the rules of the game, rather than addressing these difficulties within their national political systems.

    The solution to the problems of sagging economic growth among the developed societies has been one that seeks to define spheres of interest where they can enjoy the non-competitive advantages of trade exclusion that will permit their domestic economies to function without addressing domestic social spending. And there already have been visible examples which show its debilitating effect upon international order. The scramble among major nations for preferential access to Iraqi oil before the Iraq War, with France's TotalFinaElf being the best/worst example, showed that the concerns of upholding standards of international law were meaningless where national economic interest was in play. But there are also other instances that demonstrate this trend, such as the negotiation of exclusive markets in Africa for European "non genetically-modified" grains. You may remember how some European Union members were prepared to let Zambians starve in 2002 to preserve their market for non-genetically altered foods. The universal standards that were embodied in the original formulation of the U.N. charter and the post-World War II international order it created will be relics of the past if Multi-Polarism becomes the accepted basis for the definition of a new world order and we should expect to see more of the same if the United States endorses it, as the Christopher Dodd speech seems to suggest.

    Multi-Polarism is true social imperialism that fits Vladimir Lenin's classical definition of Imperialism much more closely than it does the universal model of the post-Second World War order it is intended to replace. It embodies a new order organized to support the twin goals of limiting economic competition between developed nations in favor of the acquisition of exclusive trade access and sacrificing the level of world economic growth developing societies need in favor of a regulated international system that will preserve the social peace that more advanced societies now enjoy at the expense of their less-developed neighbors elsewhere on the globe.

    And Multi-Polarism also portends for a dark future for the causes of freedom and democracy for exactly the reasons one can see in the case of Colombia, where a nation struggling to preserve democracy and human freedom is cast aside and told that it must change its ways to accommodate the interests of other regional powers who have supported its destabilization and the weakening of its free democratic society.

    When you hear Barack Obama call for direct talks with Chavez and Castro, or when you read Christopher Dodd calling for a movement away from free trade with Latin America, or when you notice that both refuse to recognize and discuss the threats to democracy and freedom the Bolivarian Left present to the region; you have your vision of the future for American foreign policy if the Multi-Polarist Synthesis is adopted, as the Democrats now urge. It is the only framework within which they will be able to promote a social agenda whose spending levels will strip American capital of the productivity that has made the United States the prosperous nation it has been ever since the end of the second world war. And the causes of preserving and supporting democracy and human freedom will be placed at risk as well.

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